Intergenerational transmission of self-employed status in the informal sector: a constrained choice or better income prospects? Evidence from seven West-African countries by Pasquier-Doumer, Laure
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Pasquier-Doumer, Laure
Conference Paper
Intergenerational transmission of self-employed status in the
informal sector: a constrained choice or better income prospects?
Evidence from seven West-African countries
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011, No. 64
Provided in cooperation with:
Verein für Socialpolitik
Suggested citation: Pasquier-Doumer, Laure (2011) : Intergenerational transmission of self-
employed status in the informal sector: a constrained choice or better income prospects?
Evidence from seven West-African countries, Proceedings of the German Development
Economics Conference, Berlin 2011, No. 64, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/483181 
 
Intergenerational transmission of self-employed status in the informal sector: a 
constrained choice or better income prospects? Evidence from seven West-
African countries
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Social reproduction is the highest for self-employed as shown by an extensive literature from 
developed and developing countries. Very few studies however document the reason for this high 
intergenerational correlation of the self-employed status. The rare studies that have been done 
concern the US and show that children of self-employed benefit from an advantage when they are 
themselves self-employed. The purpose of this paper is to test in the African context if the second-
generation of self-employed has an advantage related to the first-generation. It aims at highlighting 
the debate between two  visions: the first  of informal sector as the less-advantaged sector of a 
dualistic labour market,  and  the second as a sector of personal choice and dynamic 
entrepreneurship. Using 1-2-3 surveys collected in the commercial capitals of seven West African 
countries in 2001-2002, this paper shows that the second-generation of informal self-employed does 
not have better outcomes than the first one, except when they choose a familial tradition in the 
same sector of activity. Thus, in the African context, having a self-employed father does not provide 
any advantage in terms of profit or sales and is not sufficient for the transmission of a valuable 
informal human capital. On the other hand, informal entrepreneurs who have chosen a specific 
enterprise based on familial tradition have a comparative advantage. Their comparative advantage is 
partly explained by the transmission of enterprise-specific human capital,  acquired thanks to 
experiences in the same type of activity and by the transmission of social capital that guarantees a 
better clientele and a reputation.  
JEL:  L26, J24, J62 
Keywords: informal sector, entrepreneurship, intergenerational link 
 
   
                                                            
1 This research is part of a project entitled “Unlocking potential: Tackling economic, institutional and social 
constraints of informal entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa” (http://www.iss.nl/informality) funded by the 
Austrian, German, Norwegian, and Korean Government through the Multi Donor Trust Fund Project: Labor 
Markets, Job Creation, and Economic Growth; Scaling up Research, Capacity Building, and Action on the 
Ground”. 2 
 
Since the 1970’s, research on informal sector constitute a growing part of the literature. The upsurge 
in interest is at least partly because most households in many developing countries, in particular 
poor households, derive a large part of their earnings from informal sector. It constitutes an often 
unacknowledged contribution to national production levels as well. However, despite nearly four 
decades of research, no consensus has emerged on the origin and the causes of informal sector. A 
long tradition, namely the “dualist school”, views informal sector as the less-advantaged segment of 
a dual-labour market (Lewis 1954, Harris and Todaro 1970, Pradhan 1995). In this view, informal 
entrepreneurship is the result of the saturation of the formal sector. Therefore, being worker in the 
informal sector is a constrained choice and a large informal sector is evidence of inefficiency. A more 
recent approach views informal sector as a dynamic and voluntary entrepreneurial small firm sector, 
where individuals choose to be informal entrepreneurs because they expect a higher welfare than if 
they were wage-earners or formal entrepreneurs (Maloney 2004, Packard 2007). In this approach, a 
large share of informal self-employed may reflect an efficient allocation of labour. While the debate 
has become in the last years increasingly polarized (Bacchetta et ali. 2009), an integrated approach is 
currently arising based on the idea of multi-segmented labour-markets (Chen 2005, Fields 2005). This 
alternative approach considers that the informal sector is comprised of different segments. The 
upper-tier segment may be populated by entrepreneurs who choose to entry into informal sector 
while the lower-tier segment may be dominated by constrained households that could not have 
other choice of activity.   
While there is no consensus on the voluntary nature of the entry into informal self-employment, 
strong evidences show the importance of the intergenerational transmission of the self-employed 
status. In the USA, half of the self-employed have a self-employed in their family (Dunn and Holt-
Eakin 2000). In France, 41% of entrepreneurs have their father or father-in-law who is entrepreneur 
(Laferrère and McEntee 2001). In West Africa, social reproduction is also  the highest for self-
employed (Pasquier-Doumer 2010a). However, very few studies document the reasons for this high 
intergenerational correlation of the self-employed status. The rare studies deal with data from 
developed countries and show that having a self-employed father provide an advantage in terms of 
earning exepcted (Dunn and Holt-Eakin 2000, Lentz and Laband 1990, Fairlie and Robb 2007a 2007b, 
Colombier  and  Masclet  2006  2008, Laferrère and  McEntee  1996). In the context of developing 
countries, the high correlation across generations of the self-employed status raises the following 
question: Do the children of self-employed become themselves self-employed because they have an 
advantage relatively to the children of wage earner? In other words, do the children of self-employed 
have a better access to valuable informal human capital, physical or social capital? If they have such 
advantage, one can support the idea that second-generation of self-employed chooses voluntary to 
entry into informal sector because they expect better incomes. They then constitute a dynamic and 
voluntary entrepreneurial segment of informal sector. 
The aim  of this paper is twofold.  First,  it seeks to know if the second generation of informal 
entrepreneurs has in the West African context  an advantage in terms of business outcomes 
compared with the first generation.  Second, it aims at identifying the nature and the source of such 
an advantage. Is it through intergenerational transmission of informal human capital, physical or 
social capital? What is the respective weight of each of these different channels? These issues seem 
particularly relevant in the African context for two main reasons. On the one hand, inequalities in 
Africa are very high and social mobility very low (Cogneau et ali 2007). Therefore, this paper will 
contribute to understand the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. On the other hand, 3 
 
informal activities are the main provider of income and of jobs for most African urban dwellers 
(Brilleau et ali 2005). In addition, informal sector is the prevalent place of professionalization and 
integration of young people into the labour market, in particular for those whose drop out of school 
(Walther 2007).  
Section 1 provides an overview of the literature and introduces the context. Section 2 presents the 
data and  the empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the main characteristics of the second 
generation of self-employed. Section 4 examines the existence for the second-generation of informal 
self-employed of a comparative advantage. Section 5 analyses the composition of this advantage. 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.   
 
1.  Literature review and context 
Some studies analyze for developed countries the impact of having self-employed parents on the 
determinants of becoming self-employed rather than wage earner (Dunn and  Holtz-Eakin 2000, 
Colombier and Masclet 2008, Laferrère and McEntee 1996). They all conclude to substantially higher 
probability to become self-employed among children of self-employed. Two main channels are 
identified. First, successful entrepreneurs may be more able and willing to transfer financial wealth 
to their children and thus allow them to relax capital market constraints. Second, parents transmit to 
their  children  valuable work experience, reputation or other managerial human capital. Thomas 
Dunn and Douglas Holtz-Eakin (2000) find that, in the USA, family credit market contributes very little 
to the correlation of self-employment  status across  generations. In contrast, self-employment 
experience of the parents has a strong effect. Because parental experience has a greater impact 
when parents was successful, the authors conclude that the significance of parents’ self-employment 
reflects the transmission of skills or other aspects of human capital and not the conveyance of tastes 
for autonomy or for a self-employed lifestyle.  
To my knowledge, only two studies aim at understanding the impact of familial background on small 
business outcomes (Lentz and Laband 1990, Fairlie and Robb 2007b). Both relate to the USA. Bernard 
Lentz and David Laband  (1990) suppose that individuals acquire general managerial skills while 
growing up in the context of family business through the continued exposure to the family business. 
Children of self-employed have then an advantage compared with children of wage-earner, whose 
do not see their parents at work: “The father/teacher passes on to his son valuable human capital 
about running a business operation; the son acquires this integrated, managerial human capital as a 
by-product of growing up. By the time he reaches the age of, say, eighteen, when most other youths 
his age are just starting to acquire job-specific skills (via employment training programs) or more 
general occupational skills (via college), the son of proprietor normally has already had an 
opportunity to accumulate the equivalent of an integrated, managerial education.” (p. 564). The 
authors show that second-generation proprietors have greater success compared with first-
generation proprietors. Because second-generation proprietors are found to start their businesses at 
a significantly younger age and to commence their business careers with a significantly greater 
quantity of managerial human capital, the authors conclude that children of proprietors have a 
comparative advantage through early acquisition of managerial human capital. The authors conclude 
that this advantage will predictably serve to motivate voluntary following behavior in children of 
proprietors.  4 
 
As for Robert Fairlie and Alicia Robb (2007b), they identify three potential channels that can explain 
the better outcomes of the second generation of self-employed: the acquisition of general business 
or managerial experience in family-owned businesses, the acquisition of industry- or firm-specific 
business experience in family-owned businesses and inheritances of businesses. In the latter case, 
parents transmit capital as a reputation capital or an established clientele from one generation to the 
next. With another data than Lentz and Laband, they show that having a prior work experience in a 
family member’s business is a significant determinant of small business outcomes. They also find that 
inherited businesses are more successful than non-inherited, but their representation among the 
population of small businesses is very limited. The authors conclude that the second-generation of 
self-employed have an advantage in terms of business outcomes compared with self-employed 
without self-employed family member through the transmission of managerial experience and/or 
firm-specific business experience.  
In developing countries, there is no specific study on the impact of familial background on informal 
businesses outcomes. However, one can find some evidences in the literature on social capital, in 
particular on the effect of familial kin-ship on businesses outcomes.  
Marcel Fafchamps (2002)  investigates whether social networks improve firm productivity among 
agricultural traders in Madagascar. While a quarter of surveyed traders had either a father or a 
mother in trade and 14% are in this business because of family traditions, the author finds that 
having close relatives in agricultural trade do not have a positive effect on the productivity.  Added to 
the finding that productivity is higher among traders who learned the business on their own and did 
not receive coaching from relatives, they conclude that family relationships do not constitute a 
productive component of social capital. They may nevertheless help at business start-up for capital 
and experience. 
Fafchamps’s results may not be generalized however to the whole informal sector and to West 
African countries firstly, because the way of acquisition of informal human capital in West African 
countries is very different from the one in Madagascar and secondly, because trade is a specific 
sector of activity in terms of acquisition of skills and level of capital required.  
Actually, in West African informal sector, there are two main ways to acquire informal human capital: 
through informal apprenticeship training and on his or her own, through experience. In the capital of 
seven West African countries, 27.8% of the informal business owners have learned their profession 
through informal apprenticeship training, whereas this proportion is only 14.2% in the Madagascan 
capital.  If  trade is excluded, then  informal apprenticeship training
  raises to 40.7% of informal 
business owners  in West African countries but  only 16.8% in Madagascar
2.  Therefore, informal 
apprenticeship is much rarer in Madagascar than in West Africa. It is also rarer in trade activities than 
in manufacturing or services activities. Moreover, trade is a very specific sector of activities in terms 
of the amount capital required. For example, in the West African countries the average amount of 
capital in informal trade businesses is 528 international dollars compared with 1053 in the other 
sectors
3
                                                            
2 Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS for Abidjan, 
Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey, Ouagadougou and Phase 2, 2001/02, INSTAT, DIAL for 
Antananarivo). 
.   
3 Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS) 5 
 
In West Africa, informal apprenticeship training is commonly conceived in three phases:  during the 
first year, the apprentice is expected to observe what the  master  craftsman and the  workshop 
workers are doing. In a second phase, the apprentice is shown certain practices and gradually asked 
to do some practical work. In the ultimate phase, the apprentice is fully involved in workshop 
activities and held responsible for his  or  her output (Haan 2006). During this last phase, 
organizational, management and business skills are also transmitted, including costing, marketing, as 
supplier and customer relations. Having a family member involved in the same type of activity can 
thus improve the acquisition of informal human capital by two ways. Firstly, the choice of the master 
is essential for the transmission of skills. Some masters may take advantage of a high demand of 
training, multiplying the number of apprentices with the result that they do not have time to 
supervise the apprentices and they do not have enough order to make them practice (Charmes and 
Oudin 1994). If one of the members of the family is involved in this type of business, the family may 
be more able to choose a master with high professional skills and with a good turnover. Moreover, 
family ties continue in West Africa to play an important role in the selection of apprentices (Birks and 
ali 1994). Having family members in the same activity may allow to be more easily accepted by a 
“good” master. Secondly, because informal apprenticeship training has its roots in socio-cultural 
traditions that restricted the transfer of skills to members of the family or the clan (Haan 2006), one 
can think that the transmission of enterprise specific skills may be better with a master related to the 
family. 
In the case of acquisition of informal human capital through experience, having a self-employed 
family member may increase the opportunities to accumulate experience in his/her business. This 
experience may also be more valuable in terms of acquisition of informal human capital because the 
owner may give more responsibility to a family member for two reasons: on the one hand because of 
socio-cultural traditions that facilitate transmission of skills inside the family, on the other hand 
because the family could have a greater interest in the professional success of one of its members 
than in the one of someone unrelated to the family.  
As in developed countries, having a self-employed family member may facilitate the acquisition of 
physical capital. On the one hand, self-employed, at least successful one may have more capacity to 
invest than wage earner. On the other hand, some of the second generation of self-employed 
inherits a part or the whole enterprise of their family member.  
In their study, Lentz and Laband (1990) do not include social capital as a possible way of 
intergenerational transmission of self-employed status. Fairlie and Robb (2007b) introduce it but very 
indirectly, as a component of the inheritance of a family enterprise. They do not formally test it. 
Because of imperfect markets, social capital plays  in developing countries a crucial role in the 
performance of informal businesses (Bacchetta et ali. 2009). As shown by Fafchamps (2005), social 
capital and more precisely social networks improve the circulation of reliable information about 
technology and market opportunities as well as the blacklisting of unreliable agents. Social capital 
can also make easier to build up a clientele through reputation and trust. In addition, as shown by 
Pasquier-Doumer (2010b) a large part of social network mobilized with  the  aim of improving 
professional activities is related to the family. One can thus think that the potential advantage of 
second-generation of self-employed can be partly explained by social networks.    6 
 
2.  Empirical strategy and data 
 
For these reasons, this paper aims at testing two main hypotheses. The first one (H1) is that having a 
self-employed father procures an advantage for informal business owners  in terms of business 
performance, through transmission of managerial skills and physical capital. The second one (H2) is 
that informal business owners having family members involved in the same type of activity have 
better outcomes than the other one, thanks to better endowments in specific-enterprise skills, 
physical capital and social capital and thanks to better returns of specific-enterprise skills and social 
capital. 
In a first step, let consider a firm with labour, physical, and human capital denoted L, K, and H 
respectively and let its production function be denoted: 
𝑉 = 𝐹(𝐿,𝐾,𝐻)      (1) 
If the first hypothesis is correct, we expect that having a self-employed father allows better informal 
business’ performance because of better endowments in physical capital K and in human capital H. 
Testing the first hypothesis leads then to estimate the equation (1) introducing a dummy variable 
denoted SE that takes the value 1 if the firm’s owner has a self-employed father and 0 otherwise. If 
this variable is not significant, it means that the first hypothesis is incorrect. If it is significant and 
positive, I introduce in the model interactions between SE and K and between SE and H to know if 
better firm’s performance is only due to better endowment in human and physical capital or if having 
a father self-employed raises also the productivity of human and physical capital.  
In order to test the second hypothesis, I introduce in the estimation of equation (1) a dummy 
variable denoted TRAD that takes the value 1 if the firm’s owner inherits a familial tradition, or in 
other words if the owner has family members involved in the same type of activity
4
𝑉 = 𝐹(𝐿,𝐾𝐼,𝐾𝑁𝐼,𝐻𝑀𝑆,𝐻𝐸𝑆𝑆,𝑆)      (2) 
. I expect that 
TRAD has a positive and significant effect on informal business performance.  If it is the case, I try in a 
second step to identify the channels that can explain the better outcomes of the informal business 
owners,  who  inherit a familial tradition. Following Fafchamps (2005),  I then introduce in the 
production function social capital as input, denoted S. I also split human capital into general 
managerial skills 𝐻𝑀𝑆 and enterprise-specific skills 𝐻𝐸𝑆𝑆 and I introduce a proxy of inherited physical 
capital 𝐾𝐼.  
I test if the interactions between TRAD and proxies of specific-enterprise skills and between TRAD 
and proxies of social capital are positive and significant. If it is verified, TRAD would then enter the 
regression as productivity shifter. Employing  a  Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition will allow us  to 
evaluate the respective weight of better performance due to better endowments and the one due to 
better returns. 
                                                            
4 More precisely, TRAD takes the value 1 if the owner says  
-  She or he has created the informal business by familial tradition, and/or 
-  She or he has chosen the informal business’ product/services by familial tradition, and/or 
-  One of his/her family members has created the informal business. 7 
 
In these estimations, I am confronted to the usual problem of possible endogeneity of the production 
factors because of their accumulation over time  and because of unobservable characteristics. 
Unfortunately, to correct for this bias I have to my disposal neither panel data nor good instruments. 
That’s why I choose a very simple approach that just splits the sample into informal businesses with 
different levels of capital stock and labour. 
In this study, I use a set of surveys called 1-2-3 surveys and carried out between 2001 and 2002 in 
seven commercial capitals of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries: 
Cotonou (Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Bamako (Mali), Niamey 
(Niger), Dakar (Senegal) and Lomé (Togo). A 1-2-3 survey is a multi-layer survey organized in three 
phases and specially designed to study the informal sector (see Brilleau, Ouedraogo and Roubaud, 
2005). For this paper, I use the phase 1 and 2 of the surveys. Phase 1 is a representative labor force 
survey collecting detailed information about individual employment and socio-demographic 
characteristics, in particular the sector and status of activity of the father when individual was 15 
years old. Phase 2 is a survey which interviews a sub-sample of informal production units identified in 
Phase 1.  It provides  very detailed data on the profit, sales, investments, inputs of the informal 
enterprises and on the characteristics of the owner. The 1-2-3 surveys define informal enterprises as 
small production units that (a) do not have written formal accounts and/or (b) are not registered 
with the tax administration. The 1-2-3 surveys do not apply a size criterion. 
A major advantage of the 1-2-3 survey is its nested structure because Phase 1 ensures that Phase 2 
delivers a representative picture of the informal sector. Another one is that it allows us to identify 
the second generation of self-employed (variables SE and TRAD) and it gives some proxies of informal 
human capital, social capital and intergenerational transmission of physical capital. 
To estimate equation (1), I choose value added as firm’s performance measure.  Value added, also 
called profit, is the difference between total sales and total purchases in value that means all costs 
for intermediate inputs including all paid wages and the income of the owner. Price differences 
between countries are adjusted. Value added is the preferred measure of output but, because data 
on margins are subject to measurement error, I use total monthly sales as an alternative measure of 
output. 
Labour (L) is defined as the number of monthly paid hours used in the informal business. Physical 
capital (K) includes buildings and other locations, machines, furniture, vehicles and tools. All items 
are evaluated at replacement costs. Like for value added, price differences between countries are 
adjusted. Human capital (H) is measured by the potential experience of the owner
5
To estimate equation (2), inherited physical capital (𝐾𝐼) is taken into account using three variables: (i) 
the amount of physical capital obtained through the family
 in the labour 
market which reflects the gross time that owners have spent while in the labour force, and by the 
owner’s education and his literacy in French.   
6
                                                            
5 Age minus years of schooling minus seven, the legal age at school entry. 
, (ii) a dummy that takes the value 1 if the 
6 More precisely, I consider that physical capital is obtained through the family if the owner said that the capital 
is funded by familial loan, inheritance or by donation from one member of the family or from a friend. 
Unfortunately in the latter case, we cannot distinguish in the survey between friends and family. I suppose that 
donation from friends is virtually nonexistent, as shown by Pasquier-Doumer (2010b) in the case of 
Ouagadougou.  8 
 
share of physical capital obtained through the family is higher than half of the whole amount of 
physical capital and 0 otherwise, (iii) a dummy that takes the value 1 if the owner used a location 
given by the family and 0 otherwise.  
There are three proxies of general managerial skills (HMS). The first one is that the owner has a 
managerial experience becoming the owner  of the informal business surveyed.  A  previous 
experience as entrepreneur in another business is supposed to increase the ability of the owner to 
manage the informal business. The second one is that the owner knows micro-finance institutions. It 
reveals better access to information that can improve productivity. The last one is that the owner 
keeps books. It implicates better organization in the way of conducting the business.  
To take into account enterprise-specific skills (HESS), we have four variables at our disposal. The first 
one takes the value 1 if the owner learned his profession by informal apprenticeship training and the 
value 0 otherwise, for the most part if he learned his profession on his own. Informal apprenticeship 
training gives to the owner a previous experience in his sector of activity during which transmission 
of enterprise-specific skills may be high. The second one is that the owner has a previous experience 
in the informal business that he actually manages, before becoming the owner. This experience may 
give him a good knowledge of technology used in the business, of market opportunities, of clientele 
and suppliers. It also allows him to be known by the clientele. The third one is that the owner has 
previous experience in this activity outside his actual business. Lastly, I use the number of years of 
experience in his actual activity. 
Social capital of the owner (S) is approached by two dummies. The first one takes the value 1 if the 
owner says he doesn’t have any difficulties in finding clientele and that the lack of clients is not the 
main obstacle to activity development. It takes the value 0 if one of these statements is not made. 
This variable may reflect consumer loyalty, good reputation, and that the business is well-known. 
However, this variable may suffer an endogeneity bias because it is likely that the self-assessment of 
the owner is influenced by the profit level. Owners with high profits are more likely to say they don’t 
have any lack of clientele. That why I retain a more exogeneous proxy of social capital which is a 
membership to a professional association. In the West-African context, knowing the way of joining a 
professional association and being accepted as member may be more linked with the level of social 
capital than with the size of the enterprise, although this topic is very few documented.     
 
3.  What distinguish second generation of self-employed? 
Second-generation of self-employed represents 60% of the informal business owners. Among them, 
53% have of father self-employed and 16% inherits a familial tradition
7
                                                            
7 9% of second-generation of self-employed have both a self-employed father and have inherited a familial 
tradition.  
  (Table  1).  As expected, 
second-generation of self-employed has  in average  better outcomes than the other informal 
business owners. However the difference is only significant regarding the sales of informal businesses 
with familial tradition. Their enterprises are older, in particular when they inherit a familial tradition 
and they are more homogeneous with regard to ethnic criteria and familial relationship. Informal 
businesses with familial tradition are in addition more labour intensive and less capital intensive. 9 
 
They are overrepresented in the sector of wholesale and retail shops and underrepresented in the 
sectors of construction and services (Table 1).  
Table 1: Characteristics of informal businesses that are owned by second-generation  






   Mean/Freq  Mean/Freq  Sign  Mean/Freq  Sign 
Profit (mean, Int. $)  322,6  326,0  NS  371,4  NS 
Sales (mean, Int. $)  978,8  987,5  NS  1175,4  *** 
Capital (mean, Int. $)  770,9  787,5  NS  699,4  NS 
Paid labour (mean, monthly hours)  244,6  244,8  NS  263,2  *** 
Age of the MSE (mean)  6,8  7,2  ***  9,8  *** 
Ethnic homogeneity in the MSE (%)  95,3  95,7  ***  96,0  *** 
Share of the workers from the same family  91,6  92,0  ***  93,7  *** 
Sectors of activity                
Clothing and apparel   10,1  9,7  **  8,5  NS 
Other manufacturing and food  12,3  11,5  NS  12,5  NS 
Construction  5,9  5,7  NS  3,1  *** 
Wholesale/retail shops  11,1  12,0  NS  15,6  *** 
Petty traders  34,4  34,9  ***  31,8  NS 
Hotels and restaurants  6,0  6,3  NS  5,9  NS 
Repair services  4,4  4,3  **  3,1  *** 
Transport  3,8  3,9  NS  2,3  *** 
Other services  17,3  11,7  **  12,0  *** 
N obs  6536  3292     951    
Frequency  100  53     16    
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS) 
Note: The column Sign test with t-test the significance of the difference between SE versus non-SE and 
between TRAD and non-TRAD. *, **, ***, NS means respectively that the difference is significant at the 10% 
level, 5% level, 1% level, not significant.  
 
Besides differences in the characteristics of their businesses, second generation of self-employed 
distinguish themselves by several personal characteristics (Table 2). Firstly, they are less educated. 
This result is similar to the one obtained by Lentz and Laband (1990) for USA and by Colombier and 
Masclet (2006) for Europe. These authors explain this result by a relatively less need for second-
generation of self-employed to acquire formal training since they have the opportunity to 
accumulate equivalent training through the occupation of his father.  On the other hand, second 
generation of informal self-employed are more experienced. They have in average one more year 
experience.  
If the first hypothesis is correct, we expect that children of self-employed have more managerial skills 
and a higher familial investment in terms of physical capital. In this first descriptive approach, it 
seems not be true. Although they have more often a prior experience as manager, they neither have 
a better knowledge of financial institutions nor a better managerial organization. Moreover, their 
family did not invest more in their business than the average of informal owners. At this stage, 10 
 
children of self-employed seem neither benefit from an intergenerational transmission of managerial 
skills nor from a better access to physical capital.   
Table 2: Second-generation of self-employed characteristics  






   Mean/Freq  Mean/Freq  Sign  Mean/Freq  Sign 
Female (%)  56,2  54,2  ***  55,0  NS 
Years of education  3,5  2,8  ***  2,9  *** 
Literacy in French (%)  44,9  37,0  ***  39,5  *** 
Polygamous (%)  16,4  18,4  ***  19,2  * 
Muslim (%)  57,3  58,5  ***  67,3  *** 
Has no migrated (%)  39,6  28,7  ***  40,2  NS 
Has migrated recently (%)  9,3  10,7  ***  10,8  NS 
Father has primary education (%)  6,1  2,7  ***  4,1  *** 
Father has second. edu. or more (%)  5,6  1,0  ***  4,4  *** 
Years of theoretical experience  26,4  27,9  ***  27,7  *** 
Managerial skills    
   
     
Prior management experience (%)  16,3  19,3  ***  13,2  ** 
Knowledge of MFI (%)  35,6  33,8  ***  32,3  *** 
Owner keeps books (%)  32,7  29,2  ***  33,3  ** 
Enterprise-specific skills    
   
     
Informal apprenticeship training (%)  27,6  27,9  NS  30,9  *** 
Exp. in that enterprise before becoming the 
owner (%)  45,4  47,2  NS  52,7  *** 
Experience in this profession outside this 
enterprise (%)  35,3  33,2  ***  32,0  NS 
Years worked in this profession  9,5  10,1  ***  11,7  *** 
Social capital    
   
     
No difficulties to find clientele (%)  26,4  26,7  NS  31,4  *** 
Member of a professional association (%)  4,3  4,6  ***  7,5  *** 
Familial investment    
   
     
Share of familial investment in total 
investment  21,8  21,5  NS  27,5  *** 
Amount of familial investment  220,8  240,2  NS  244,9  ** 
Family gives a location  6,3  5,8  NS  6,8  ** 
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS) 
Note:  The column Sign test with t-test the significance of the difference between SE versus non-SE and 
between TRAD and non-TRAD. *, **, ***, NS means respectively that the difference is significant at the 10% 
level, 5% level, 1% level, not significant.  
 
As far as owners with familial tradition are concerned, we expect according to the second hypothesis 
that they are endowed with more enterprise-specific skills, social capital and familial investment. It 
seems at this first stage largely true. In average, they have accumulated more experiences that are 
likely to give them higher enterprise-specific skills: experience in the informal business before 
becoming the owner, experience in their profession (two more years), and informal apprenticeship 11 
 
training. Their  social  capital seems to be larger  through a more  frequent  membership  of a 
professional association and through a more loyal clientele. Their family contributes more to the 
capital formation than family of informal business owner in their whole, both in absolute and relative 
terms.  
 
4.  Does second generation of informal self-employed have a comparative advantage? 
 
To test if having a self-employed father procures an advantage for informal business owner in terms 
of business performance, I estimates equation (1) using a Cobb-Douglas production function  as 
functional form. Business performance is measured by the log of profit and sales. Regressors include 
a dummy that take the value 1 if the owner has a father self-employed (SE), labour and capital, in the 
log form to account for the possibility of decreasing marginal returns, and human capital variables. I 
anticipate that measures of the production factors should have a beneficial effect on productivity. 
I introduce also some additional variables to control for various background characteristics: owner’s 
gender because women may face difficulties entering the upper-tier segment of informal sector for 
various reasons (household responsibilities, discrimination, restricted mobility); polygamous status 
because redistributive pressure inside the family may be higher and thus capital accumulation more 
difficult (Morrisson 2006); religion and ethnic group because they may give access to different social 
networks; migration status because recent  migrants may have weaker knowledge about market 
opportunities; father education to control for social background of the owners.    
Because of moral hazard consideration, family workers or workers from the same ethnic group as the 
owner may be more productive. For this reason, I include the share of family workers and the share 
of workers from the same ethnic group as the owner in the informal business’ workforce as well. In 
addition, since old enterprises should be better established than young ones (they have survived), I 
introduce the age of the enterprise. Lastly, I control for the sector of activity and the country.   
Table 3 below reports the main  results from OLS regression for all enterprises
8
Contrary to expectations, having a father self-employed is shown to have no effect on profit and 
sales. This result remains unchanged when I split informal businesses into different terciles of capital 
or of labour (not presented). Thus, owners that have a father involved in self-employed activities do 
not benefit from an advantage,  compared to owners without self-employed father. This result 
suggests that there is no intergenerational transmission of valuable managerial skills nor physical 
capital for children of self-employed.  
.  Because of 
endogeneity bias in the estimation of capital and labor parameters, I estimate equation (1) with and 
without introducing them in the regressors.  
 
   
                                                            
8 The full table is presented in appendix as Table A.  12 
 
Table 3: Effect of having a father self-employed on profit and sales 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Log profit  Log profit  Log sales  Log sales 
              
Father was self-employed (SE)  0.0472  0.0342  0.0404  0.0456 
 
(0.0445)  (0.0466)  (0.0394)  (0.0388) 
Owner's theoretical experience  0.0346***  0.0155**  0.0402***  0.0149*** 
 
(0.00574)  (0.00623)  (0.00508)  (0.00518) 
Owner's theoretical experience squared  -0.000488***  -0.000254***  -0.000561***  -0.000237*** 
 
(8.44e-05)  (9.18e-05)  (7.45e-05)  (7.62e-05) 
Owner's education  -0.0149  -0.0220  -0.0172  -0.0296** 
 
(0.0167)  (0.0177)  (0.0148)  (0.0147) 
Owner's education squared  0.00419***  0.00344**  0.00428***  0.00385*** 
 
(0.00127)  (0.00136)  (0.00110)  (0.00111) 
Owner's diploma is primary certificate  -0.0247  -0.0438  0.0107  0.00241 
 
(0.0630)  (0.0658)  (0.0557)  (0.0548) 
Owner's diploma higher than primary certificate  -0.0182  -0.00880  0.136  0.101 
 
(0.100)  (0.105)  (0.0884)  (0.0874) 
Owner's literacy in French  0.143**  0.108*  0.126**  0.0900* 
 
(0.0600)  (0.0631)  (0.0531)  (0.0527) 


















Constant  5.696***  2.776***  7.287***  3.605*** 
 
(0.189)  (0.273)  (0.166)  (0.226) 
          Observations  4959  4108  5179  4301 
R-squared  0.241  0.294  0.320  0.420 
Controls: Owner's gender, polygamous status, religion, ethnic group, migration status, father education; Ethnic 
homogeneity inside the enterprise, share of family workers, age of the enterprise; Sectors of activity and 
countries dummies. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Author's computation based on 
1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
 
Regarding the other variables, results by and large conform with expectations: other things being 
equal, higher levels of labour, human and physical capital leads to higher performances; women have 
lower outcomes expectations than men; being born in the city is an advantage compared with 
migrants; having an educated father has a significant and positive effect on businesses outcomes.   
However, marital status, religion and ethnic group are not significant
9
                                                            
9 Polygamous status is significant and has a positive effect on profit and sales, contrary to expectations, but only 
when capital and labour are not introduced in the regression.  
 and ethnic homogeneity and 
the share of family members in the enterprise has a significant but negative effect on outcomes. As 
in Fafchamps (2005), family members thus appear to work less hard than hired workers. This could 
be explained by a familial pressure to redistribution that leads to share the labour, even if there are 
too many workers regarding the work to do.  13 
 
We now consider the narrower definition of second generation of self-employed, that is owners 
whose inherit a familial tradition. The purpose is to test if the second hypothesis is correct, namely if 
informal business owners having family members involved in the same type of activity have better 
outcomes than the other one. I thus estimate the same equation as previously but introducing the 
variable TRAD instead of SE. I also estimate the equation on subsamples, splitting informal businesses 
into different terciles of capital (models (7), (8) and (9) for profit, (15), (16) and (17) for sales) or of 
labour (models (10), (11) and (12) for profit, (18), (19) and (20) for sales). Results are presented in 
Table 4 for profit and Table 5 for sales
10
Tables 4 and 5 show that having inherited a familial tradition has a positive and significant effect on 
informal businesses outcomes. This result is robust to the choice of outcomes variables and to the 
inclusion of capital and labour variables. It remains unchanged for informal businesses with high level 
of production factors as well. But having inherited a familial tradition has no significant effect for low 
and medium level of production factors, with the exception of a positive and significant effect of 
TRAD on sales for businesses with medium level of capital.  
.  
Table 4: Effect of inheriting a familial tradition on profit  
   (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
VARIABLES  All  All  K<q1  q1<K<q2  K>q3  L<q1  q1<L<q2  L>q3 
  
                MSE with familial 
tradition (TRAD)  0.127**  0.119**  0.0903  0.0722  0.213**  0.0713  0.0938  0.145* 
 
(0.0495)  (0.0519)  (0.0822)  (0.0767)  (0.0978)  (0.0981)  (0.0798)  (0.0813) 
Owner's 
theoretical exp.  0.036***  0.016***  0.039***  0.020**  0.034***  0.047***  0.022***  0.026*** 
 
(0.0051)  (0.0056)  (0.0076)  (0.0086)  (0.0108)  (0.0092)  (0.0079)  (0.0098) 
Owner's theor. 
exp. sqd   -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
 
(7.5e-05)  (8.1e-05)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Years of edu.  -0.0100  -0.0189  0.0180  -0.0200  -0.0376  0.00398  -0.0248  -0.0180 
 
(0.0151)  (0.0160)  (0.0256)  (0.0264)  (0.0269)  (0.0283)  (0.0252)  (0.0252) 
Years of edu.sqd  0.004***  0.003***  0.003  0.001  0.006***  0.004*  0.004**  0.005*** 
 
(0.00116)  (0.00124)  (0.00210)  (0.00220)  (0.00186)  (0.00207)  (0.00208)  (0.00187) 
Diploma=  -0.0166  -0.0512  0.0306  0.0688  -0.0814  0.0231  -0.0400  -0.0389 
   primary certif.  (0.0578)  (0.0603)  (0.104)  (0.0957)  (0.0994)  (0.108)  (0.0921)  (0.0994) 
Diploma>  -0.00967  -0.0143  -0.0397  0.154  -0.0555  -0.126  0.114  -0.0112 
   primary certif.  (0.0924)  (0.0976)  (0.174)  (0.156)  (0.153)  (0.174)  (0.158)  (0.149) 
Literacy in French  0.0999*  0.0729  0.0178  0.118  0.0913  0.135  0.105  0.0829 
 
(0.0541)  (0.0569)  (0.0926)  (0.0902)  (0.0963)  (0.103)  (0.0848)  (0.0932) 




           
   
(0.0115) 
            Amount of paid 
labour in log 
 
0.346*** 
           
   
(0.0263) 
            Constant  5.728***  2.859***  5.304***  6.213***  5.678***  4.669***  5.463***  5.853*** 
 
(0.169)  (0.247)  (0.403)  (0.290)  (0.309)  (0.383)  (0.297)  (0.278) 
                  Observations  5891  4875  1938  2016  1937  1778  2080  2033 
R-squared  0.245  0.299  0.210  0.211  0.223  0.149  0.232  0.278 
 
Controls: idem models (1) to (4). Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                                            
10 Table B in the appendix presents the full table.  14 
 
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
 
With regard to these results, we can conclude that informal business owners who have family 
members involved in the same sector of activity have on the whole an advantage in terms of 
business performance, compared with owners without familial tradition.  In contrast, this is no longer 
true when we only consider owners of businesses with low or medium level of productivity factors. 
Therefore,  in the lower-  or medium-tier segment of informal sector, having inherited a familial 
tradition provides no advantage. This result differs from the one of Fafchamps (2005) but as we 
already said, the context and the field of study are very different.    
Concerning the other variables, results are the same than those of the estimation of equation 
including the variable having a self-employed father (SE). 
Table 5: Effect of inheriting a familial tradition on sales 
   (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
VARIABLES  All  All  K<q1  q1<K<q2  K>q3  L<q1  q1<L<q2  L>q3 
  
                MSE with familial tradition 
(TRAD)  0.143***  0.119***  0.0513  0.148**  0.224***  0.0135  0.102  0.196*** 
 
(0.0437)  (0.0431)  (0.0766)  (0.0655)  (0.0810)  (0.0849)  (0.0698)  (0.0713) 
Owner's theor. experience  0.0449***  0.0193***  0.0571***  0.0253***  0.0307***  0.0529***  0.0323***  0.0316*** 
 
(0.00456)  (0.00467)  (0.00721)  (0.00742)  (0.00887)  (0.00805)  (0.00706)  (0.00848) 
Owner's theor. experience sqd   -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
 
(6.65e-05)  (6.80e-05)  (0.000104)  (0.000106)  (0.000133)  (0.000122)  (9.97e-05)  (0.000123) 
Owner's education  -0.0134  -0.0277**  0.0260  -0.0412*  -0.0391*  0.0194  -0.0263  -0.0391* 
 
(0.0133)  (0.0133)  (0.0240)  (0.0225)  (0.0224)  (0.0249)  (0.0218)  (0.0219) 
Owner's education sqd  0.00439***  0.00420***  0.00202  0.00325*  0.00624***  0.00185  0.00495***  0.00700*** 
 
(0.00101)  (0.00101)  (0.00195)  (0.00188)  (0.00151)  (0.00182)  (0.00176)  (0.00161) 
Diploma=primary certif.  0.00631  -0.0177  -0.0179  0.0914  -0.0137  0.00660  -0.00608  0.0118 
 
(0.0511)  (0.0502)  (0.0974)  (0.0819)  (0.0825)  (0.0949)  (0.0807)  (0.0863) 
Diploma>primary certif.  0.130  0.0671  0.200  0.235*  0.0726  0.135  0.290**  -0.00185 
 
(0.0816)  (0.0811)  (0.163)  (0.133)  (0.127)  (0.154)  (0.136)  (0.130) 
Literacy in French  0.108**  0.0812*  0.0624  0.132*  0.0604  0.0767  0.0718  0.168** 
 
(0.0479)  (0.0474)  (0.0870)  (0.0768)  (0.0803)  (0.0914)  (0.0742)  (0.0810) 
Amount of capital in log  0.168*** 
           
   
(0.00954) 
            Amount of paid labour in log  0.438*** 
           
   
(0.0217) 
            Constant  7.238***  3.594***  6.637***  7.711***  7.537***  6.234***  6.699***  7.411*** 
 
(0.149)  (0.205)  (0.379)  (0.248)  (0.254)  (0.336)  (0.258)  (0.241) 
                  Observations  6143  5092  1999  2080  2064  1858  2147  2138 
R-squared  0.322  0.425  0.260  0.280  0.371  0.247  0.279  0.325 
Controls: idem models (1) to (4). Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
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5.  What is the source of advantage? 
 
After having established the positive effect of having inherited a familial tradition with the same 
choice of activity, we have to highlight the channels though which this familial tradition provides an 
advantage. I will then test the hypothesis that this advantage is mainly due to better endowments in 
specific-enterprise skills, physical capital, social capital, secondly better returns of specific-enterprise 
skills and social capital. To this effect, I will expand the estimation of equation (2), presented in the 
methodological issue, to include social capital, familial investments, general and enterprise-specific 
skills in the production function.  
If the hypothesis is true, I expect two results. First, I anticipate that the effect of social capital, familial 
investments, general and specific-enterprise skills are significant and positive or in other words that 
these factors enter the regression as productivity shifters.  Second,  I  surmise  that these effects 
capture the one of having inherited a familial tradition. It means that the variable TRAD is significant 
in equation (1) only because it reflects  better endowments and/or returns of managerial skills, 
enterprise-specific skills, familial investment and/or social capital. To know which factors better 
capture the effect of TRAD, I will introduce them step by step, first one by one (not reported) and 
then by pairs.  
I find that when I introduce only one of these factors, the effect of TRAD is still significant. Among 
proxies of managerial skills, knowledge of microfinance institutions and book keeping have a positive 
and significant effect on profit. However, prior management experience doesn’t have any effect on 
enterprise performance. This could be explained by the wide variety of management experiences 
that not necessary provide better knowledge of how to run a business. Among proxies of enterprise-
specific skills, three of them have positive and significant effect: informal apprenticeship, experience 
in the informal business before becoming the owner and years of experience in the profession. In 
contrast, having experience in the profession outside the informal business doesn’t have any effect. 
There is then no evidence that a previous experience in the same type of activity but outside the 
actual business procures higher enterprise-specific skills. Like for previous management experience, 
this  could be due to  heterogeneity of experiences  in terms of responsibility, duration and 
characteristics of the enterprise where the experience took place.   
Table 6 presents the estimation of equation (2) introducing proxies of transmission channels by pairs. 
It shows that  the effect of having inherited a familial tradition  disappears only when we jointly 
introduce proxies of enterprise-specific skills and social capital. The other combinations do not allow 
capturing the whole effect of TRAD. In the same way, when I measure business performance by sales 
instead of profit (not reported), I find that the decrease of TRAD effect is the highest when proxies of 
enterprise-specific skills and social capital  are jointly introduced. In this case, the estimated 
coefficient is almost halved.  
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Table 6: Effect of inheriting a familial tradition on profit introducing social capital, two types of skills 
and inherited physical capital  
   (5)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)  (25)  (26) 
VARIABLES 
Log 
profit  Log profit  Log profit  Log profit  Log profit  Log profit  Log profit 
                       
MSE with familial tradition 
(TRAD)  0.127**  0.110**  0.113**  0.138***  0.0779  0.102**  0.107** 
 
(0.0495)  (0.0493)  (0.0489)  (0.0492)  (0.0493)  (0.0497)  (0.0493) 
Proxies of managerial skills 
              Prior management experience  
 
0.0523  0.0221  0.0265 
     
   
(0.0467)  (0.0461)  (0.0463) 
      Knowledge of MFI 
 
0.132***  0.122***  0.137*** 
     
   
(0.0378)  (0.0376)  (0.0378) 
      Owner keeps books 
 
0.423***  0.425***  0.431*** 
     
   
(0.0496)  (0.0494)  (0.0497) 
      Proxies of enterprise-specific 
skills 
              Owner was informal apprentice 
 
0.0910** 
   
0.106**  0.105** 
 
   
(0.0422) 
   
(0.0422)  (0.0425) 
  Exp. in that enterprise before  
 
0.218*** 
   
0.227***  0.226*** 
       becoming the owner (Y/N) 
 
(0.0601) 
   
(0.0600)  (0.0605) 
  Exp. in this profession outside  
 
-0.0123 
   
-0.00695  -0.00934 
       this enterprise (Y/N) 
 
(0.0402) 
   
(0.0402)  (0.0405) 
  Exp. in this profession (years) 
 
0.009*** 
   
0.008***  0.0091*** 
 
   
(0.00272) 
   
(0.00270)  (0.00272) 
  Proxies of social capital 
              No difficulties to find clientele 












Owner is member of a business  






   association 






Proxies of familial investment 
              Share of familial invesment in  
     
-0.136*** 
 
-0.121**  -0.108** 
   total investment 
     
(0.0499) 
 
(0.0503)  (0.0498) 
Amount of familial investment 
     
2.2e-05*** 
 
2.2e-05***  1.9e-05*** 
       
(7.66e-06) 
 
(7.69e-06)  (7.68e-06) 
Family gives a local 
     
0.133 
 
0.141  0.145* 
       
(0.0852) 
 
(0.0858)  (0.0852) 
Constant  5.728***  5.016***  5.052***  5.186***  5.412***  5.562***  5.601*** 
 
(0.169)  (0.188)  (0.178)  (0.179)  (0.179)  (0.180)  (0.169) 
                Observations  5891  5814  5891  5887  5814  5810  5887 
R-squared  0.245  0.262  0.267  0.258  0.262  0.253  0.257 
Controls: idem models (1) to (4). Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that more valuable social capital and higher enterprise-specific 
skills contribute to why informal business owners with family members involved in the same sector 
of activity have better outcomes. One question remains:  is  the advantage explained by better 
endowments of social capital and enterprise-specific skills or by better returns of these factors? 
Therefore I will examine by using decomposition methods what is the respective weight of better 
endowments and better returns of social capital and enterprise-specific skills in the explanation of 
the  better outcomes.  Decomposition methods aim at understanding the gap in the means of a 
outcome variable (informal business performance) between two groups (owners with and without a 17 
 
familial tradition). I will then decompose the gap into that part that is due to differences in the 
magnitudes of the determinants of the outcome one the one hand, and group differences in the 
effects of these determinants on the other. In other words, I will estimate the respective weight of 
endowments in production factors and of returns of these factors in the explanation of the gap. The 
most common approach to identifying sources of intergroup gap is the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973). In this approach, two separate production function are 
estimated for owners with and without familial tradition. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is: 
log𝜋𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ������������ − log𝜋𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ������������� = 𝗽𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ������� − 𝑥𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ���������) + (𝗽𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝗽𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑)𝑥𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ���������           (3) 
where 𝜋𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝜋𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 are the profit of owners with and without familial tradition, respectively; 
𝑥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ������� and 𝑥𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ��������� are vectors containing the respective means for owners with and without familial 
tradition of the independent variables. The first term on the right hand side captures the profit 
differential due to different endowments of owners with and without familial tradition. The second 
term is the profit gap attributable to different returns to those endowments. To deal with the index 
problem and test the robustness of the results with different weighting schemes, I also use the 
decomposition method proposed by Neumark (1988). Table 7 reports the results of decomposition 
based on Oaxaca-Blinder’s and Neumark’s approaches.  
Table 7: Oaxaca-Blinder and Neumark decomposition of profit and sales gap between owners with 
and without familial tradition 
   Log profit  Log sales 
   Oaxaca-Blinder  Neumark  Oaxaca-Blinder  Neumark 
   Coef.  %  Coef.  %  Coef.  %  Coef.  % 
Raw gap  0,181***     0,181***     0,189***     0,189***    
Due to coefficents and interactions  0,069  38,5  0,083  45,8  0,103  54,9  0,104  55,4 
Due to endowments  0,111  61,5  0,098  54,2  0,085  45,1  0,084  44,6 
Contribution from raw gap in endowments                          
Owner was informal apprentice  0,004  2,2  0,005  2,8  0,001  0,5  0,002  1,1 
Exp. in that enterprise before becoming the 
owner   0,018  9,9  0,021  11,6  0,007  3,7  0,009  4,8 
Exp. in this profession outside this enterprise   0,000  0,0  0,000  0,0  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Exp. in this profession (years)  0,024  13,3  0,025  13,8  0,017  9,0  0,019  10,1 
Prior management experience   -0,001  -0,6  -0,001  -0,6  0  0,0  -0,001  -0,5 
Knowledge of MFI  -0,005  -2,8  -0,007  -3,9  -0,009  -4,8  -0,011  -5,8 
Owner keeps books  0,015  8,3  0,015  8,3  0,02  10,6  0,019  10,1 
No difficulties to find clientele  0,016  8,8  0,016  8,8  0,012  6,3  0,012  6,3 
Owner is member of a professional association  0,010  5,5  0,011  6,1  0,011  5,8  0,011  5,8 
Share of familial investment in total investment  -0,011  -6,1  -0,009  -5,0  -0,01  -5,3  -0,009  -4,8 
Amount of familial investment  0,006  3,3  0,003  1,7  0,007  3,7  0,004  2,1 
Family gives a local  0,001  0,6  0,002  1,1  0,002  1,1  0,003  1,6 
All  0,077  42,5  0,081  44,8  0,058  30,7  0,058  30,7 
Contribution in Social capital  0,026  14,4  0,027  14,9  0,023  12,2  0,023  12,2 
Contribution in Enterprise-specific skills  0,046  25,4  0,051  28,2  0,025  13,2  0,030  15,9 
Contribution in Managerial skills  0,009  5,0  0,007  3,9  0,011  5,8  0,007  3,7 
Contribution in Familial investment  -0,004  -2,2  -0,004  -2,2  -0,001  -0,5  -0,002  -1,1 
Controls: idem model (5). Note: *** p<0.01; in bold are the coefficient significant at the level 0.05. 
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
 
First, profit differential is mostly explained by differences in endowments: 61.5% of the profit gap is 
due to differences in the magnitudes of production factors when Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is 18 
 
used and 54.2% with Neumark decomposition. This result remains unchanged if we consider sales 
instead of profit, even if share of raw gap explained by endowments is lower (45.1% and 44.6% using 
the two methods). Another way of convincing the reader that the source of advantage of owner with 
familial tradition is mostly due to better endowments consist in estimating production function with 
interactions between TRAD and the production factors. Positive and significant coefficients of these 
interactions mean better return of production factors for owners with familial tradition. The results 
are presented in the table C of the Appendix and show that all the interactions are not significant. 
There is one exception, that is the interaction between TRAD and the amount of familial investment 
but the coefficient is negative. Therefore familial capital has worse returns when it is used in an 
informal business with familial tradition.  
Second, if we have a look at the contribution of each variable that may explain the advantage of 
owners with familial tradition,  we find that only four variables have a positive and significant 
contribution: experience in that enterprise before becoming the owner, experience in this 
profession, no difficulties to find clientele, membership  to  a professional association  explain 
respectively 9.9%, 13.3%, 8.8% and 5.5% of the profit gap. Taken together, proxies of enterprise-
specific skills and social capital are the main contributors of the profit gap. They explain 39.8% of it 
with Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and 43.1% with Neumark decomposition. This share is weaker 
when sales gap is considered but is still significant, more than a quarter of the gap.  
Third, the familial investment in the business capital explains virtually none of the gap. Owners with 
familial tradition are not better endowed in capital coming from the family than the other owners. 
On the contrary, they are found to be worse endowed. In the same way, differential in endowments 
in managerial skills explains very little of the gaps in business outcomes.  
Because differentials in proxies of enterprise-specific skills and social capital explain most of the 
outcome gap between owners with and without familial tradition and because the effect of TRAD 
disappears when these proxies are introduced, we can say that the main source of the advantage of 
owners with familial tradition is a better access to enterprise-specific skills and to social capital.  An 
alternative hypothesis would be that the better outcomes of owners with familial tradition only 
reflect an ability bias because the family sorts inside the family members the more able to manage 
the familial enterprise. But the results presented show that this alternative hypothesis has to be 
rejected.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
An important finding of this research is that for West-African informal entrepreneurs, having a self-
employed father does not provide any advantage in terms of profit or sales. Children of self-
employed don’t have better access to valuable human, physical or social capital. On the contrary of 
USA or European countries, there is no intergenerational transmission of general managerial skills, 
which could explain a comparative advantage for children of self-employed. This specificity of West 
African countries with regard to USA or European countries might be due to a different way of 
exposure to the business of the father or higher differentials in terms of managerial skills used.  19 
 
Then, the strong correlation of self-employment status across generations can not be explained by 
the existence of a comparative advantage for children of self-employed. Other explanations have to 
be found. Alternative determinants of this correlation can be put forward: the conveyance of taste 
for autonomy, a self-limitation of professional aspirations or a segmented structure of the labour 
market  that constrain children of self-employed to be themselves self-employed in the informal 
sector. However, we don’t have evidence to justify acceptance of one hypothesis over  another. 
Further research is needed. 
The second important result of this research is that having family members involved in the same type 
of activity is important for informal businesses, in particular for business in the upper-tier segment of 
informal sector. The owners with familial tradition have a comparative advantage in terms of profit 
or sales. This advantage is mostly explained by the transmission of enterprise-specific human capital, 
acquired thanks to higher opportunities to accumulate experiences in the same sector of activity, and 
by the transmission of social capital that guarantees a better clientele and a reputation. On the 
contrary, owners with familial tradition don’t have better access to physical capital or to managerial 
skills. 
This paper casts a new light on the voluntary nature of the entry into informal sector. It defends the 
idea of multi-segmented labour-markets where some owners choose to entry informal sector 
because they expect large profit. One of the characteristics of these owners is that they have family 
members involved in the same type of activity.  
These findings are important from a policy perspective. Most policies currently in place aiming at 
improving efficiency of informal sector are targeted toward alleviating financial constraints. Other 
programs focus on reinforcing  general business human capital, for example management  and 
financial  skills.  The findings of this research suggest that providing opportunities  for work 
experiences in informal businesses and developing professional networks through associations may 
be good policies. They might allow would-be informal owners to acquire enterprise-specific skills and 
develop their social capital. They would then contribute to improve informal sector efficiency and 
reduce intergenerational inequalities in business ownership patterns. However, these issues deserve 
further investigation on the effectiveness of these types of policies, especially evidence from impact 
evaluations of experimental programs.  
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Appendix 
Table A: Effect of having a father self-employed on profit and sales (full table) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Log profit  Log profit  Log sales  Log sales 
              
Father was self-employed (SE)  0.0472  0.0342  0.0404  0.0456 
 
(0.0445)  (0.0466)  (0.0394)  (0.0388) 
Owner's female  -0.656***  -0.386***  -0.610***  -0.265*** 
 
(0.0453)  (0.0500)  (0.0401)  (0.0417) 
Owner's education  -0.0149  -0.0220  -0.0172  -0.0296** 
 
(0.0167)  (0.0177)  (0.0148)  (0.0147) 
Owner's education squared  0.00419***  0.00344**  0.00428***  0.00385*** 
 
(0.00127)  (0.00136)  (0.00110)  (0.00111) 
Owner's diploma is primary certificate  -0.0247  -0.0438  0.0107  0.00241 
 
(0.0630)  (0.0658)  (0.0557)  (0.0548) 
Owner's diploma higher than primary certificate  -0.0182  -0.00880  0.136  0.101 
 
(0.100)  (0.105)  (0.0884)  (0.0874) 
Owner's literacy in French  0.143**  0.108*  0.126**  0.0900* 
 
(0.0600)  (0.0631)  (0.0531)  (0.0527) 
Owner's polygamous  0.0904*  0.0360  0.0835*  0.0389 
 
(0.0541)  (0.0570)  (0.0474)  (0.0471) 
Owner's Muslim  0.0718  0.0688  0.0687  0.0643 
 
(0.0584)  (0.0610)  (0.0515)  (0.0507) 
Owner belongs to the majority ethnic group  -0.0478  -0.0367  -0.0380  -0.0342 
 
(0.0406)  (0.0429)  (0.0358)  (0.0356) 
Owner's not a migrant  0.109**  0.0818*  0.0966**  0.0656* 
 
(0.0431)  (0.0451)  (0.0379)  (0.0374) 
Owner's migrated recently  0.0168  0.111  -0.0509  0.0331 
 
(0.0698)  (0.0762)  (0.0618)  (0.0633) 
Father's primary education   0.164**  0.0628  0.111*  0.0100 
 
(0.0749)  (0.0796)  (0.0653)  (0.0652) 
Father's secondary education or more  0.194**  0.172**  0.118*  0.0755 
 
(0.0802)  (0.0835)  (0.0704)  (0.0691) 
Owner's theoretical experience  0.0346***  0.0155**  0.0402***  0.0149*** 
 
(0.00574)  (0.00623)  (0.00508)  (0.00518) 










(8.44e-05)  (9.18e-05)  (7.45e-05)  (7.62e-05) 
Ethnic homogeneity in the enterprise  -0.396***  -0.287**  -0.491***  -0.306** 
 
(0.144)  (0.144)  (0.126)  (0.119) 
Share of family members in the enterprise  -1.033***  -0.363***  -1.270***  -0.432*** 
 
(0.106)  (0.113)  (0.0940)  (0.0938) 
Age of the MSE  0.0150***  0.0122***  0.0183***  0.0145*** 
 
(0.00284)  (0.00300)  (0.00251)  (0.00251) 


















Constant  5.696***  2.776***  7.287***  3.605*** 
 
(0.189)  (0.273)  (0.166)  (0.226) 
          Observations  4959  4108  5179  4301 
R-squared  0.241  0.294  0.320  0.420 
Controls: Sectors of activity and countries dummies. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, 
DIAL, INS). 23 
 
 
Table B: Effect of having inherited a familial tradition on profit and sales (full table) 
   (5)  (6)  (13)  (14) 
VARIABLES  ln_profit  ln_profit  ln_sales  ln_sales 
  
        MSE with familial tradition (TRAD)  0.127**  0.119**  0.143***  0.119*** 
 
(0.0495)  (0.0519)  (0.0437)  (0.0431) 
Owner's female  -0.632***  -0.358***  -0.590***  -0.244*** 
 
(0.0411)  (0.0454)  (0.0363)  (0.0378) 
Owner's education  -0.0100  -0.0189  -0.0134  -0.0277** 
 
(0.0151)  (0.0160)  (0.0133)  (0.0133) 
Owner's education squared  0.00409***  0.00354***  0.00439***  0.00420*** 
 
(0.00116)  (0.00124)  (0.00101)  (0.00101) 
Owner's diploma is primary certificate  -0.0166  -0.0512  0.00631  -0.0177 
 
(0.0578)  (0.0603)  (0.0511)  (0.0502) 
Owner's diploma higher than primary certificate  -0.00967  -0.0143  0.130  0.0671 
 
(0.0924)  (0.0976)  (0.0816)  (0.0811) 
Owner's literacy in French  0.0999*  0.0729  0.108**  0.0812* 
 
(0.0541)  (0.0569)  (0.0479)  (0.0474) 
Owner's polygamous  0.0866*  0.0420  0.0688  0.0266 
 
(0.0486)  (0.0514)  (0.0426)  (0.0424) 
Owner's Muslim  0.0851  0.0831  0.0814*  0.0760* 
 
(0.0526)  (0.0552)  (0.0465)  (0.0459) 
Owner belongs to the majority ethnic group  -0.0232  -0.0147  -0.0151  -0.0177 
 
(0.0371)  (0.0392)  (0.0327)  (0.0325) 
Owner's not a migrant  0.108***  0.0911**  0.0885***  0.0690** 
 
(0.0385)  (0.0404)  (0.0339)  (0.0335) 
Owner's migrated recently  0.0322  0.109  -0.0544  0.0197 
 
(0.0638)  (0.0693)  (0.0564)  (0.0576) 
Father's primary education   0.178**  0.0780  0.118*  0.00785 
 
(0.0693)  (0.0735)  (0.0603)  (0.0600) 
Father's secondary education or more  0.134*  0.130*  0.0710  0.0328 
 
(0.0745)  (0.0779)  (0.0653)  (0.0643) 
Owner's theoretical experience  0.0363***  0.0162***  0.0449***  0.0193*** 
 
(0.00516)  (0.00561)  (0.00456)  (0.00467) 
Owner's theoretical experience squared  -0.000513***  -0.000263***  -0.000626***  -0.000300*** 
 
(7.52e-05)  (8.18e-05)  (6.65e-05)  (6.80e-05) 
Ethnic homogeneity in the MSE  -0.468***  -0.367***  -0.522***  -0.342*** 
 
(0.130)  (0.130)  (0.114)  (0.107) 
Number of unpaid family members in the MSE  -1.049***  -0.360***  -1.288***  -0.436*** 
 
(0.0965)  (0.103)  (0.0854)  (0.0857) 
Age of the MSE  0.0156***  0.0133***  0.0184***  0.0158*** 
 
(0.00263)  (0.00278)  (0.00233)  (0.00232) 


















Constant  5.728***  2.859***  7.238***  3.594*** 
 
(0.169)  (0.247)  (0.149)  (0.205) 
          Observations  5891  4875  6143  5092 
R-squared  0.245  0.299  0.322  0.425 24 
 
Controls: Sectors of activity and countries dummies. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, 
DIAL, INS). 
 
Table C: Effect of having inherited a familial tradition on profit and sales with interactions 
   (5)  (27) 
VARIABLES  Log profit  Log profit 
MSE with familial tradition (TRAD)  0.127**  0.00593 
Proxies of managerial skills  (0.0495)  (0.106) 
Prior management experience  
 
0.0289 
   
(0.0495) 
TRAD*Prior management experience  
 
0.114 
   
(0.133) 
Knowledge of MFI 
 
0.0731 
   
(0.0403) 
TRAD*Knowledge of MFI 
 
0.239** 
   
(0.105) 
Owner keeps books 
 
0.426*** 
   
(0.0516) 
TRAD*Owner keeps books 
 
-0.00248 
Proxies of enterprise-specific skills 
 
(0.114) 
Owner was informal apprentice 
 
0.0952** 
   
(0.0455) 
TRAD*Owner was informal apprentice 
 
0.0537 
   
(0.102) 
Exp. in that enterprise before becoming the owner (Y/N) 
 
0.199*** 
   
(0.0624) 
TRAD*Exp. in that enterprise before becoming the owner 
 
0.0980 
   
(0.106) 
Exp. in this profession outside this enterprise (Y/N) 
 
-0.0219 
   
(0.0427) 
TRAD*Exp. in this profession outside this ent. 
 
0.0366 
   
(0.107) 
Experience in this profession (years) 
 
0.00977*** 
   
(0.00285) 
TRAD*Experience in this profession 
 
-0.00806 
Proxies of social capital 
 
(0.00487) 
No difficulties to find clientele 
 
0.304*** 
   
(0.0426) 
TRAD*No difficulties to find clientele 
 
0.0557 
   
(0.106) 
Owner is member of a professional association 
 
0.310*** 
   
(0.0876) 
TRAD*Owner is member of a professional association 
 
0.0658 
Proxies of familial investment 
 
(0.190) 
Share of familial invesment in total investment 
 
-0.140** 
   
(0.0547) 
TRAD*Share of familial invesment in total inv. 
 
0.00246 
   
(0.130) 
Amount of familial investment 
 
3.95e-05*** 
   
(1.03e-05) 




   
(1.52e-05) 
Family gives a local 
 
0.0671 
   
(0.0938) 




   
(0.219) 
Constant  5.728***  4.929*** 
 
(0.169)  (0.188) 
Observations  5891  5810 
R-squared  0.245  0.277 
 